Abstract-For many years, the pay-TV system has attracted a lot of users. Users have recently expressed the desire to use mobile TV or mobile payment via anonymous protocols. The mobile users have also received their services over cellular communications networks. Each mobile device receives services from each head end systems. With increasing numbers of users and the expansion of Internet, user's privacy has become crucial important. When a device leaves the head end system's range, it must receive services from another head end system. In this paper, we review Chen et al's scheme and we highlight some weaknesses, including privilege insider attack and user traceability attack. Finally, we alleviate the scheme and analyze the alleviated scheme using both heuristic and formal methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, wireless communications were launched, and mobile services gradually became available. At that time, there was only one mobile operator that provided service to a few users. Then, the second generation of mobile communications was introduced as cellular networks under the GSM standard [1] . Mobile communications rapidly progressed. To date, communications have changed significantly four times. These changes and technological mutations were introduced as different generations of wireless communications technology so that today, the fourth generation of this method of communication is utilized. It is predicted that a new generation of mobile communications will be introduced in 2020 that will provide users with great speed and accuracy [1] , [2] , [3] . Pay-TV system has attracted many users for almost 30 years. In 1994, the number of people who used this technology reached 3.45 million in England. It doubled after 4 years [4] . Currently, numerous users use mobile devices to watch TV, and many communication systems have been provided for using the mobile-TV services [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . In these systems, the user can receive services after registration in a head end system (HES) network and store his/her information The summary of this article has been submitted at http://ist2018.itrc.ac.ir/ * Corresponding author: Saeed Banaeianfar saeed banaeian far@yahoo.com in the database server (DBS) of the HES. At first, the HES only broadcasts one authentication message to all the users who request the same service [5] . Additionally, in [7] , a user can access a television channel and play any video on his/her mobile phone. Since smart card-based networks and mobile phone users are shifting to an ad hoc and comletely mobile mode, HES cannot provide service to users everywhere. Therefore, when mobile users leave an area covered by a HES, they should receive services from another HES [8] , [28] , [9] , [10] . First of all, they have to be authenticated again. In [8] the MobiCash protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was proposed, and [28] used symmetric encryption functions. Constantin Popescu and Lo-yao Yeh's schemes are also based on bilinear pairing [9] , [10] . Recently, user privacy has acquired special significance so that the demand for anonymous communication in networks has increased, and service providers have to authenticate users remotely and anonymously [11] , [12] , [13] . Bapana describes an anonymous authentication protocol suitable for distributed computer networks [14] . Yang et al. proposed a two-party secure roaming protocol based on identity based signatures (IBS) [12] . There are multiple servers, and each server manages a set of subscribers who are users of the network. Dedong et al. presented a model of two access modes: self-access and cross-domain access [13] . In self-access, the internet service providers (ISP ) provide service to users directly, and cross-domain access is similar to that of a roaming network. Anonymous authentication schemes could meet these requirements. The validity and legality of a user's identity is approved in anonymous authentication schemes while divulging their true identity to no one. In some schemes, not only is the user's identity anonymous on public networks and channels, but users inside the network and attackers also cannot retrieve the user's ID [14] , [16] . Even the server occasionally does not realize the user's ID [18] . In some schemes, there is no registration table for user authentication on the server [18] , but the server can validate and authenticate the users anonymously.
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Our main contributions are listed follows:
• We present a great user anonymity. It means that we assume that an adversary has the server secret key and user password, but it cannot obtain the user's identity. • We improve the Chen's scheme [16] against privilege insider attack attack. It means that the severs have no ability to obtain the users sensitive information.
• We improve the Chen's scheme [16] against user traceability attack.
• We analyze the alleviated scheme using both heuristic and formal methods. In this paper, after discussing related work in section 2 and prerequisites for the scheme in section 3, we describe and analyze Chen et. al's scheme [16] in section 4. It should be noted that Kim et al have also promoted this scheme against stolen smart card-based attacks [19] , but it is almost infeasible as long as the user chooses just strong password because it requires succeed brute force attack. In the following, we explain our alleviated scheme. Then, we analyze the alleviated scheme in heuristic and formal forms. Finally, we compare our scheme with recently proposed schemes.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we categorize pay-TV systems in 4 groups. At first, we describe signature-based pay-TV systems. Blind signature is practical way to verify user authentication by valid party, anonymously. Other categories are based on bilinear pairing, digital signature, encryption/decryption function, and hash function. Since hash function are light and secure, it is applied for lightweight schemes which are suitable for weak devices such as sensors and smart phones. We depict this section on the table I, in summery.
• Pairing-based pay-TV systems
Other researchers proposed heavy scheme based on bilinear pairnig, such as Wang et al proposed an authentication scheme for access control in mobile pay-TV systems, in 2012 [17] . Their protocol was resist against forgery, Man-in-the-Middle M itM , and replay attacks. Thus, an adversary can pass the verification phase successfully. Its performance is good, but as we said, it is based on bilinear pairing and that's not suitable for lightweight devices. In 2013, Liu used identity-based encryption in his scheme [5] . A number of schemes also used cryptographic functions and bilinear pairings (e.g., [6] , [28] , [9] , [10] ). Sabzinejad Farash made improvments [10] against impersonation attacks (User impersonation and HES impersonation) in [6] . Sabzinejad Farash's scheme [6] is also a robust and secure system which is the running time of protocol shorter than the previous schemes. However, his proposed scheme is designed with bilinear pairing. It is too heavy and unsuitable for the weak devices. In 2015, Heydari et al proposed an authentication scheme resists against impersonation attack. They launched their attack on issue phase and generalized it on other phases [27] .
Recently, Wu et al. proposed an authentication schemes for mobile pay-TV, but it does not support anonymity [28] . Anonymity is being supported through pairing transform in [29] . Also, in 2017, Wu et al. proved that the Sabzinejad protocol has some weaknesses [30] . For example, it does not support mutual authentication. But there is no modified scheme. Then, Biesmans et al proposed pay-per-view and a pay-per-channel that protect users' privacy [40] .
• Signature-based pay-TV systems A user's connection with banks is another payment method that can be mentioned. Blind signature is another method for anonymization. In this method, a legitimate party signs the blinded message of users. After signing, other people can see the original message along with the valid signatures of the legal party. In 1996, Camenisch presented a communication scheme in an anonymous way in which a blind signature was used [20] . Subsequently, authors have tried to provide more efficient schemes for mobile-pay systems. Customers in this scheme have to open an anonymous account and there is no need for the bank to identify the customers. In 2009 Bakhtiari et al presented the M obiCash scheme based on the blind signature and the customer's relationship with the bank [8] . Its blind signature is based on ECDSA crypto system. In 2016, Wu et.al proposed an efficient scheme [28] . Their scheme is a powerful scheme based on user signature. The user who wants to uses TV, must register as legal user via proposed scheme and creates session key to watch the TV. The user signs its message and sends it to server. Server verifies the received message with open.algorithm which is proposed in this scheme.
• Encryption-based pay-TV systems Encryption-based schemes are most practical classification. This category neither heavy nor light. Thus, are not suitable for weak devices. For example, Yang J-H and Chang proposed ID-based scheme on ECC crypto system for remote user authentication [15] . It has some drawbacks such as vulnerability to insider and impersonation attacks [16] . In the hash-based pay-TV system (the next category), we describe Chen's scheme [16] and then analyse it in the section 4. In 2017 Arshad et al proposed an efficient scheme [39] based on Wang's scheme [17] . But, there is no bilinear pairing functions and Arshad's scheme is easy to implement on F P GA boards.
• Hash-based pay-TV systems
In 2011, Chen modified the ECC-based scheme of Yang J-H and Chang [15] . The modified protocol is lightened and redesigned only with hash function but without ECC using [16] . Then in 2012, Kim et al improved Chen's scheme [16] and made it robust against smart cardbased attacks [19] . We will explain in section 4 that the improvement is not true. In recent years, low energy consumption on smart cards has been motivated by an increase in the energy efficiency and productivity of schemes so that some of the designed [21] , [24] , [26] ). In 2014, Tsai proposed a light anonymous authentication protocol [24] . Then, in 2015, Kuo et al. also presented a lightweight scheme based on smart cards [26] . The lightweight schemes are popular, since light devices have been developed. So, we focus on this category of pay-TV systems.
In the section 5, we discuss the [6] , [10] , [16] , [19] and our scheme, in the compare them with our improved scheme. We illustrate that our alleviated scheme is more secure than noted schemes.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we explain preliminaries of our paper. These functions are used for lightweight protocols with low power consumption, so common encryption functions are not used. After presenting the required security features in anonymous authentication schemes, we briefly explain cellular communication. Finally, we explain the analysis of schemes through a formal method.
A. Parameters and Entities Description a) Describe the entities involved in this paper: In Table  II , the list of entities and parameters are depicted. Below, we explain the role of each of the entities [16] .
• HES: A system sending broadcast TV service to receivers. 
B. Security Requirements
In this section, we mention the definitions of security requirements and the need for anonymous authentication protocols with multi-server service providers. Noted that the hash function have to be secure in standard model against relevant attacks. One-way hash functions with no collisions are functions with variant input and constant length output. From their characteristics, we can note that they do not have collisions and that they are one-way [32] .
• Privacy Preserving
Privacy is a range of personal and private information of the user that the user wants to be protected and unavailable to As [33] . In this paper, user identity requires protection. Because users want to log − in anonymously and keeps his/her identity private.
• User Anonymity
User anonymity is a kind of privacy policy in networks. User anonymity means that user's identities cannot be obtained and find a link to trace the users by any channel eavesdropping, stolen smart card, or access to the user database stored in server memory [31] . According to increasing user requests to join the networks and uses internet-based services, user's privacy has become particularly important and identity anonymity is more considered.
• User Traceability
Traceability means that if a user logs − in to a server several times, or to multiple servers in several different points, A or other users cannot determine wheter is the same user that was previously logged − in to the server or not [35] .
• Resistance against privilege insider attack
There are many HESes in the cellular network and users can get services from them. They authenticate users and then the users can use the services. To authenticate users, the HESes obtain the real users' identity and then verify their log − in request. It is clearly that in this attack all HESes know the real users' identity and if one of the HESes is malicious, the users' privacy is broken [36] . But, we want to the HESes learn no privacy information about the users' identity.
• Forward and Backward Security
Forward security means that when the user is out of the network (or network service is revoked) and he is not a member of the network he must not retrieve encrypted messages after leaving or revocation. In fact, it means that the set of keys in the next sessions must be independent of the set of keys in the previous ones. Backward security means that if a user recently was a member of that network with a new key to server, this user would no longer retrieve previous session keys. This user cannot retrieve the previous encrypted information by having either the exchanged information in the past or the current key [34] .
For secure communication, it is necessary that both parties presuade each other to confrim the identity. So, the user is known to the server, and the user is able to authenticate the server through the mutual authentication protocol [18] .
C. Formal Security Analysis
Many proposed anonymous authentication protocols have been analyzed via ad hoc methods, but all of their drawbacks have not been discovered. Hence, there is no doubt that a formal method to discover the privacy and security drawbacks is required. A's capabilities and threat models are classified in formal analysis. In this case, the adversary is capable of not only eavesdropping on the channel but also revealing secret data via data recovery through smart card power analysis attack [37] . A game-based model is applied to prove each attack. A tries to success in the designed game. We illustrate that A succeeds in designed game over Chen's scheme [16] . However, it fails in designed games over our improved scheme. According to the protocol's attributes, a formal analysis method has three functions [37] , [33] : (i) the experiment function, (ii) the success function, and (iii) the probability function. as follows:
• Experiment function (EXP): A performs the process to get the required information.
• Success function (Succ): It specifies how successful A is in gaining important data.
• Probability function (Pr): A's probability of success in the recovery of secret values. If the probability of success is negligible ( ), the latter protocol is secure against assumed A [33] .
D. Adversary abilities
In this section we describe A abilities. We allow A to achieve all parameters stored in smart card and database of servers, and it can eavesdrop the public channel, to show the security power of our alleviated scheme. In the following we describe A abilities [11] , [36] , briefly:
• A can eavesdrop the public channel.
• A can achieve to parameters stored in smart card.
• A can achieve to verification table which is the servers has access to it. In the section 4.3, we show our scheme is secure against all of smart card-based and stolen server attacks, as well as privacy drawbacks such as lack of anonymity and traceability. In the following, after explaintion of Chen's scheme [16] and its weaknesses, we depirt our modified scheme indetails.
IV. REVIEW OF THE CHEN ET AL. SCHEME In this section, we investigate Chen's scheme [16] . This scheme has 4 phases: initialization, issue, subscription and hand-off. After briefly explaining the procedure of this protocol, we mention its weaknesses. The Figure 1 shows the structure of general mobile pay-TV system. The Figure 2 and the Table III depict the the phases of Chen's scheme and correspondence between M S and HESes.
• Initialization phase
Users are registered in DBS of HES through SAS/SM S, and their ID is stored in DBS along with N. If N = 0, the user's identity and N = 1 is stored. These communications are carried out through a secure channel. To perform this process, the following steps are performed by U i : U i chooses ID i , P W i , and generates b. Then it computes P W B i = h(P W i ⊕ b) and submits ID i and P W B i to S.
S checks ID i is already in its database or not. Then it calculates:
Here U D = h(ID i N ). S issues the smart card containing [K, R, Q] and sends it to U i over secure channel.
For each log − in and acquisition of service from each HES in the network, the user should send a log − in request and receives a Θ as a token. This token is used in the subscription phase. Kim et al. has attacked this phase [19] . The attack scenario is as follows: A listens to a user's session in the issue phase and steals the user's smart card. A could obtain P from C i = h(P CID i T 1 n i ) by using the values of C i , CID i , T 1 , and n i from the intercepted messages [19] . Due to the security of the secure one-way hash function, the probability of retrieving P from C i is negligible (ε). As a result, A cannot impersonate the user, and Chen's scheme is secure against stolen smart card attacks. In the following we describe the issue phase of Chen's scheme: U i enters ID i and P W i and computes:
Then it generates a random number n i and calculates:
HES receives m at T 2 and performs the following steps: Checks T 2 − T 1 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej). Then it calculates:
and verifies ID i if is a valid user identity. Else, it terminates the log − in request. Then calculates:
then it checks C i = C i , if they are equal HES accepts the log − in request and calculates R t = R i ⊕ h(y n i ). Now, it chooses Θ i , then calculates: 
HES broadcasts the mutual authentication message
. U i receives m 2 and checks the T 3 − T 2 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej). Then it computes D i = h(P CID i T 2 n i ) and checks D i = D i . Finally, it calculates certified token θ = E i ⊕ h(P T 2 n i ) as the session key to get Pay-TV service.
• Subscription phase
For communicating with HES using the obtained Θ communicated with HES and calculated γ. Then, it communicated with HES and set the authentication key.
To calculate γ the following steps should be done: U i inputs its ID and P W and computes:
then it generates a random number n i and calculates:
HES receives m at T 2 and checks T 2 − T 1 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej). Then calculates ID i = CID i ⊕ h(y T 1 n i ) and verifies if ID i is valid user's identity and computes
If they are equal, HES accepts the log − in request and computes θ = R i ⊕ h(y n i ). HES chooses a random number γ i for U i and calculates:
In the hand-off phase for leaving the covered area of each HES and communicating with another HES, another γ should be calculated as γ i and used for obtaining future services from HES. In fact, in this phase, the users are re-authenticated without relog − in and set a new authentication session key to obtain new HES. To calculate new authentication session key, U i should be done the following steps: It generates a new random number n i and computes:
HES receives m at T 2 and checks T 2 − T 1 ≤ ∆T , then calculates:
and checks C i = h(P CID i T 1 n i ) = C i and if they are equal accepts the request. For verifying U i 's request, it calculates θ i = Z i ⊕ h(y n i ) and chooses γ as authentication session key and calculates:
and broadcasts the mutual authentication message 
A. The Weaknesses of Chen et al. Scheme
In this section, we mention the weaknesses of Chen scheme, including privilege insider attack (subsequent breaking user privacy by the HES, means that the malicious HES can obtain the users' identity and traces them), and user traceability.
1) Privilege insider attack: According to the section 3.2 and 3.4, we assume that the HESes are malicious. In the issue phase of Chen protocol, all HESes have y, which is the particular key of the server, and therefore they can use it to calculate R t = R i ⊕h(y n i ) and ID i = CID i ⊕h(y T 1 n i ). In fact, is clear, each HESes can calculate values such as R i and ID i through y. On the table IV (algorithm1), we describe this process in detail.
After obtain the real users' identity, Some users' privacy are broken as fellows:
• Breaking User Anonymity: The ID i is not directly located on the channel, users' IDs can be accessed by a simple relation using the information received from the public channel. To obtain the user's identity, it is enough to calculate the ID i = CID i ⊕ h(y||T 1 ||n i ) via the CID i , n i , and T i received from the public channel and knowing y. In such a case, the user's ID can be retrieved. This procedure is described in Table IV (Algorithm1). According to the Table IV , We prove that malicious HES succeeds in the designed game. Therefore, A can retrieve a real user ID simply with a probability of 1, so: Succ Chen A = 1.
• User Traceability: According to the procedure demonstrated in Table IV , malicious HES is able to find the user's identity easily and grabs ID i . Although, it can trace similarly the user with the algorithm1, cannot obtain that which user re-authenticates without re-login.
But it can the user in the hand off phase is same user that has been in issue phase. 2) User traceability: According to definition of user traceability mentioned in the section 3.2, A should not get any i is in the created set return 1 (success), ID * i was loged − in on the server else return 0 (failure), ID * i never loged − in on the server information about users identity. It is clearly that A has no information about y. with having y, A can obtain ID i . But, there is no need to obtain the real user identity. In this attack, A wants to know the authenticated user is the same user that was previously loged − in to the server or not.
To achieves its goal, after eavesdropping each CID i , T 1 , and n i form public channel, A chooses randomly unique y * and calculates ID * i = CID i ⊕ h(y * T 1 n i ) as pseudonym of all users send log−in request and stores all calculated ID * i s in its memory. After a while, A eavesdrops the public channel and calculate ID * i and compares it with stored set of ID * i s. If new calculated ID * i is in stored set, the user is in the authentication phase, is the same user which A calculated its pseudonym and stored its ID * . Now, A can guess this user was loged − in on the server or not with probability of 1. In fact it can classify all users in two groups. The first group: the group which has anonymous members, but A knows the group members was loged − in on the server. The second group: it has the anonymous members, but A knows the groups members never loged−in on the server. We describe this process on the Table  V. 3) Soundness: In the issue phase, subscription phase and hand-off phase of Chen's scheme the following parameters are calculated by users:
According to Chen's scheme, y is the secret key of the remote server stored in the hash function [16] . So, the users have no ability to calculate the mentioned parameters and they cannot use y.
B. Our Improved Scheme
In this section, we propose an improved issue of Chen scheme. Our improved scheme has 4 phases which we describe as below, and compare our changes with the original scheme.
We represent the protocol's procedure indetails in Tables VI  to IX. • Initialization Phase Which is shown in The mobile user generates n i as random number and calculates R i via the P W i , ID i , and R i and being authenticated. Then, it calculates and sends a log − in request to HES. In the next step, after the time stamp and the user's ID verification, the server calculates E i and D i and broadcasts m 2 . The user also calculates Θ as the Authentication session key after checking ∆T and verifying its value. This session is shown in Table VII . The mentioned process is depicted in the following: U i : U i inputs its ID, and P W and computes:
Smart card checks R i and verifies it. Then generates n i and calculates:
S: S receives m 1 at T 2 and checks T 2 − T 1 ≤ ∆T . Then it computes Kn ⊕ n i = Q i ⊕ P W B i and searches it in its database, then verifies it. Else, terminates this phase.
and verifies it. Then it chooses the token Θ and stores it on DBS and computes:
and broadcasts 
• Subscription Phase Which is shown in Table VIII . After Θ calculation and entering P W i and ID i , the user sends Kn new , C i and CID i using the obtained Θ along with n new i and T 1 to HES. If HES authenticates the user's ID, it will broadcast m 2 = [D i , E i , T 2 ] which contains γ. In the following, We describe the subscription phase of our alleviated scheme in details: U i : U i inputs its ID, and P W and computes P W B i = h(P W i ⊕ b). Then verifies R i = h(P W B i ID i ) and generates n new i and calculates following parameters:
] to HES. S: S receives m 1 at T 2 and checks
new and chooses γ as token for U i . S computes:
⊕ P W B i ) as authentication session key to get services.
• Hand-off Phase
Any user who wants to leave a HES region and log − in to another HES region have to go through this step according to Table IX . Since the user is in the primary HES region, no log − in is required. In fact, the user is re-authenticated without re-login. When this step is finished, the user obtains γ new i
for communicating with the new HES. The hand-off phase of our alleviated scheme is shown on the Table IX.  According to the Table IX 
C. Security Analysis of Our Improved Scheme
This section is composed of three subsections. After explanation of the reason of our changes, analyze the improved scheme both heuristically and formally is analyzed. Now, we analyze the main changes in our improved scheme compared with Chen's scheme. depicted in Tables VI to IX. • Removing N from DBS of HES: By storing Q i , R i , and P W B i ⊕ Q i , the server does not need to store N anymore in DBS of HES. Each user authenticates anonymously after sending the log − in request for each HES in the authentication phase by HES with stored parameters in DBS of HES.
• Removing h(y) from R: As in the Chen scheme, h(y) is the public key of the server, and it is available to all users. Its presence or absence in R value does not guarantee any security.
• Lack of using y in the generation phase: We do not use y to prevent "user impersonation" and "user traceability" attacks. We used Q i , and R i instead. Q i and R i are joint 
Receives message at T2
TABLE IX HAND-OFF PHASE -OUR IMPROVED SCHEME Re-authentication without re-login
Receives message at T 2
Chooses the new authentication session key γ new and Receives m 2 at T 3 and checks
as new Authentication session key to obtain new HES parameter between U i and HES. R i and Q i are stored in the user memory and DBS of HES produced by the server.
1) Heuristic Security Analysis:
In this section, we analyze the improved scheme in heuristic form and show that our scheme is resistant to all prevalent attacks. Imagin A has possession of sensetive information stored on the card (with power attack [18] ). we prove that the scheme resists a stolen smart card or stolen server. So, A cannot evade the users' privacy or create any interference in communications.
• Stolen server database attack and stolen verification table attack: By stealing the information stored on the server, A achieves
. We proof that A has no ability to obtain sensitive parameters:
-For x retrieval, A needs to retrieve the hash function value, which is impossible given the secure hash function. Therefore, A must again try to retrieve ID i first. Then it can run brute force attack on x. So, its success probability is (1/2) (Length−of −x)+(Length−of −IDi) . -For P W i retrieval, A needs to retrieve the hash function value, which is impossible given the secure hash function. Therefore, A must again try to retrieve b first. Then, it can retrieval P W i . So, its success probability is (1/2) (Length−of −b)+(Length−of −P Wi) .
-The other parameter which A wants to retrieve it, is ID i stored in hash function. For retrieval it, A has to run brute force attack with probability of (1/2) Length−of −IDi .
• Stolen smart card attack: By server stealing and after power analysis, A achieves
, and random number b. b does not help A to obtain the sensitive information of terms R i and Q, A also needs an exponential − time, to achieve them.
• Replay attack: There is the freshness of all sent flows on the channel and the new random number and time stamp, so there is no possibility for this attack. In fact, if A intends to resend the previous messages, it needs to access the term R i . As mentioned in the previous section, exponential time is needed to produce these parameters. It should be noted that A could access R i by possessing the server, but if A is present at the highest level of attack (stolen server) and it possesses the database of server, there is no reason for the replay attack.
• Impersonation attack: For user impersonation, A needs a pair of (ID i , P W i ) or it should be able to produce Kn, C i , and CID i . As explained in the previous sections, in order to acquire or produce the desired parameters, A needs exponential time and it cannot implement the attack in polynomial time.
• Breaking user anonymity and user traceability at- 
i , x * , P W * i , and b * as ID i , x, P W i , and b Return 1 (success) else Return 0 (failure) tacks: According to the Table VIII, it is clear that no user ID trace is placed directly on the channel. The only place that the user ID has been used is
that A is faced with this phrase with the possibility of (1/2) Length−of −hash to retrieve the user ID. If A possesses the database of a server, it can access the user's ID, but having the user ID without any adverse information is not sufficiently useful. Card stealing and the card data retrieval do not help A to achieve user's IDs. Regarding to protection of user ID, the user is untraceable. A cannot calculate the user ID, so it cannot trace the user in the hand-off phase.
• Channel eavesdropping attack: According to the description in previous sections, A cannot actively attack by channel avoidance and having the transmitted information on the channel. Also A cannot able to obtain user's ID via passive attack.
2) Formal Security Analysis:
In this section, we analyze our scheme in the formal model [37] , [33] , which is shown in Tables X to XIII (Algorithms3 to Algorithms6). In the algorithms, we show that our alleviated scheme is resistant against "channel eavesdrop" and "stolen card attack" and in random oracle model. By regarding the one-way hash function (Note that the parameters represented by * are generated by A).
• Channel eavesdropping A obtains Kn, C i , T 1 , and n i with interception. To recover the sensitive information about U i , there must be a process in accordance with the Algorithm3 that shown on the Table X.
In the designed game noted on the Table X , A eavesdrops Kn, C i , T 1 , and n i from public channel and tries to guess sensitive information. To pass the game successfully, it has to guess ID i , x, P W i , and b correctly. Since the maximum probability of success is (1/2) inputes−length . So, A is not able to guess sensitive information correctly 
So, it can not guess mentioned parameters correctly.
• Stolen smart card attack
If the smart card is stolen and corrupted by power analysis attack, A acquires stored data and tries to impersonate the user or deceive the server. A this process according to Tables XI and XII (algorithms 4 and 5). In this section, the invader tries to recover 4 parameters. To indicate that our improved scheme is secure against this attack, we design two games shown in the Tables XI and XII. In the games, A obtains R i , Q i , and b from smart card memory by power attack and runs the games mentioned in the algorithm 4 and 5.
-After recovering R i , and b, A tries to obtain the user's private key and ID which are described in Table XI indetails.
According to the Table XI, A has no chance to obtain a user's private key and ID, so:
-According to the recovering the server's private key which is described in Table X , if an output of the algorithm3 is 1 (but, we prove formally, its 
If Q * i = Q i then Return 1 and accept ID * i as user ID else return 0 probability is negligible). It means we assume that A obtains the x, and P W i successfully and tries to guess the ID i . To proof formally that A has no ability to obtain the user ID and breaks the user privacy, we design a game and depict it on the Table XII.
In the algorithm5 we assume that P r[x * = x ∩ P W * i = P W i ] = 1. However, A can obtain the user ID with negligible probability. We note that:
So, A has no chance to guess ID i successfully. It is great anonymity level (A has the server's secret and user's password, but it cannot break the user privacy and obtain user's ID).
• Stolen server attack According our alleviated scheme, R i , and Q i are parameters stored in user memory and server database. So, the designed games in this item are similar to previous item (stolen smart card attack) and there is no need to repeat the formal analysis for this item.
• Privilege insider attack
According to the section 3.2 and the definition of privilege insider attack, we assume that the servers are malicious and we want that they have no information about user identity. To prove that our alleviated scheme is resists to privilege insider attack, we design a game and show it on the Table XIII . We assumed that, we have secure one-way hash function and the success probability of obtain the hash argument is negligible. So, we note for this item:
IDi−length
V. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our improved scheme with other schemes in both security features and performance cost. Set up: Input: Kn, C i , T 1 , and n i received form public channel Output: 1 (success) / 0 (failure) Challenge: 1. Receives Kn, C i , T 1 , and n i form public channel 2. Computes Kn ⊕ n i = Q i ⊕ P W B i 3. Searches Q i ⊕ P W B i and find Q i , and R i 4. Computes P W B i = Q i ⊕ P W B i ⊕ Q i (Now, the challenger has Kn, C i , T 1 , n i , Q i , R i , and P W B i ) Note: Challenger wants to obtain ID i and it uses the parameters contain user ID Result: Challenger uses R i , and Q i to recover ID i 5. Selects randomly ID * i 6. Computes Q * i = h(ID * i x) ⊕ P W B i and R * i = h(P W B i ID * i ) Guess: If Q * i = Q i , or R * i = R i Return 1 and accepts ID * i as user ID else return 0
• Security features
Chen et al proposed a scheme for mobile pay-TV [16] , and then Kim et al improved it in 2012 against the stolen card attacks [19] . However, we mentioned in the previous sections, the improvement seems to be wrong. It has weaknesses such as breaking user privacy, user traceability and some forms of computing like Chen's scheme. In this section, we showed in the Table XIV , the benefits of our alleviated scheme compare with that of Chen et al. According to Table XIV, our improved scheme has even more security features than Sabzinejad Farash's scheme [6] and our alleviated scheme much more lighter the Farash's scheme. Also, our scheme is more secure than both Chen's scheme [16] and its improvement proposed in 2012 [19] . Our scheme is secure against stolen/lost smart card, impersonation, and stolen verifier attacks, but A can impersonate users in Yeh L's scheme [10] .
• Performance cost
In recent years, many anonymous athentication schemes for mobil pay-TV are proposed. Some of them only use of hash function and suitable for light device. According to [39] , we assume the execution time of the hash function is 0.13µs and the execution time of pairing function is 17500.354µs. It is clearly that the pairing-based schemes are much heavier and slower than the schemes use only hash function (for example, the execution time of our improved scheme in issue phase is 1.3µs and the execution time of issue phase in Wu et al [28] is about 2777.357µs). We depict in the Table XV performance comparison of our improved scheme with other light schemes. Light protocols should help them to develop. However, we have to respect to their security and privacy policies. one important aspect of privacy is an anonymity fulfilled by anonymous authentication protocols. Recently, a lot of anonymous authentication protocols have been proposed which is based on secure hash function or bilinear pairing transform. Hash-based protocols are lightweight and quick to run. Our alleviated protocol is more secure and lighter than mentioned protocols. Since the light devices such as sensors, smart cards, and smart phones are increasing, we predict lightweight protocols and hash-based protocols will be more popular to be paid.
